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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT

ISSUE FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD QF REVIEW
Did the trial court err in dismissing appellant's claim with
prejudice

on

the basis

that

appellantfs

claim

for personal

injuries was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because
appellant had an opportunity to litigate the personal injury
claim with the property damage claim in small claims court?
The standard of review concerning conclusions of law grants
the trial court "no deference, but reviews them for correctness."

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1991).
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

The decision to be reviewed was filed by the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 3rd day
of June, 1994, case no. 930904041PI.

The Appeal in this matter

was filed on the 20th day of June, 1994.

The Supreme Court has

jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3) (j) Utah
Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY

"a judgment otherwise

final remains so despite the

taking of an appeal unless what is called taking an
appeal

actually

consists

of

a

trial

de

novo." (Restatement 2d of Judgments, s.s. 13, as cited
in D'Aston V. Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1992)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties are residents of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.

An action was brought in the Small Claims Division of the

Third Judicial Circuit Court, Sandy Department, State of Utah,
for recovery of property damages on a slip and fall accident
which occurred on Defendant/Appellees1
April 10, 1991.

property on or around

Hearing was had on May 6, 1992 and judgment was

rendered in favor of the Defendant (see Addendum A-l).

Plaintiff

filed an appeal to the Third Circuit Court for a trial de novo,
which was granted and scheduled for the 28th day of August, 1992
at the hour of 2:00 p.m. before the Hon. Roger A. Livingston,
Judge of Third Circuit Court, Sandy Department.

Plaintiff, for

reasons stated in the Statement of Facts, below, did not appear
at the August 28th hearing.

Defendant did appear in person and

through counsel, and judgment was entered against the Plaintiff,
with prejudice concerning the trial de novo on or around the 22nd
day of February, 1993 (See Addendum A-2) . On or around the 30th
of December, 1993, a Complaint was filed in the Third Judicial
District Court, Salt Lake County, for personal injury damages
relating to the aforementioned accident, case no. 930904041PI.
In an order dated the 3rd day of June, 1994, the Hon. John A.
Rokich, Judge of the Third Judicial District, dismissed the case,
again with prejudice, citing the doctrine of res judicata as the
reason for dismissal (see Addendum A-3) .

An appeal was filed

with the Supreme Court of the State of Utah on the 20th day of
June, 1994 and is before the Court at this present time.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case stems from an accident that occurred on April 10,
1991. Appellant was employed by Newspaper Agency Corporation
("NAC") as a district manager. One of her

responsibilities

included ensuring home deliveries of the Deseret News, otherwise
missed, were replaced and accounted for.
On the evening of April 10, 1991, appellant was dispatched
by NAC to appellees1 home to replace a wet newspaper. Appellant
arrived at appellees1 home as a business invitee. Upon arriving
at appellees1 home appellant noticed the sidewalks and driveway
were icy as a result of a winter storm.
Appellant walked to the front door and delivered the paper.
As she was returning to her vehicle, appellant slipped on the icy
walk and fell. As a result of her fall, appellant suffered
personal injury to her hand and property damage to a diamond ring

Appellant filed a small claims action against appellees for
property damage arising out of the fall on appellees' property. A
trial was held on May

6, 1992 with the small claims judge

entering a judgment in appellees' favor (see Addendum p. A-l).
Appellant appealed the decision to the Circuit Court on May
13, 1992. A trial de novo was held on August 28, 1992. Appellant
failed to appear because of a scheduling conflict that could not
be resolved in time and because of some confusion in being able
to determine the new address of opposing counsel for Defendants,
who had recently moved, Plaintiff was not able to advise opposing
counsel of a pending hearing in United States Bankruptcy Court
which was being heard at approximately the same time and which
precluded Plaintiff's being present at the Third Circuit Court
hearing.

In spite of the fact that Plaintiff sent a friend of

hers to request a continuance, and who did not plead the case on
it's merits, the circuit court entered a judgment with prejudice
against her, but treated the judgment like a default judgment in
that it also ordered that Appellant could not refile (which would
only be done in a default situation, since a refiling after a
hearing on the merits would obviously result in a res judicata
situation) until she had paid costs and fees of the opposing
party, (see Addendum p. A-2) .
On

December

personal

30,

1993

injuries arising

appellant

filed

a

Complaint

from the fall on April

for

10, 1991.

Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss. After the parties submitted
memoranda

and

a hearing

by

the

appellant's claim with prejudice.

court, the

court

dismissed

In it's findings, the Court

held that applicable law prohibited appellant from splitting her
personal injury claim from her property damage claim and that the
bringing again of the former claim was barred by res judicata
(see Addendum p. A-3)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1.
this

The Trial Court erred in so ruling against Appellant in

matter

because,

while

countenancing

the

first

two

requirements of the three requirement test for Res Judicata, as
cited in Fitzgerald v. Corbett. 793 P.2d 356 (Utah 1990), towit:
"In order for a claim to be barred by res judicata, the
current claim and a prior claim must satisfy three
requirements:
(1) both cases
parties, their privies
that is asserted to
presented or be such
presented in the first

must involve the
or assignees; (2) the
be barred must have
that it could have
case . . ."(6359)

same
claim
been
been

it failed to take into account the third requirement, which
states that
"the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment
on the merits."(ibid.)
ARGUMENT
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DISMISSING APPELLANT'S CLAIM WITH
PREJUDICE ON THE BASIS THAT APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR PERSONAL

INJURIES WAS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA BECAUSE
APPELLANT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LITIGATE THE PERSONAL INJURY
CLAIM WITH THE PROPERTY DAMAGE CLAIM IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT?

The nature of a judgment in Small Claims Court appears
always to have been tempered by the following two paragraphs;
first:

"(1) Either party may appeal the judgment of the small
claims department of the circuit . . . court to the
circuit court of the county . . •"
and
"(2) The appeal to the circuit court is a trial de novo
and shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of
the small claims department, except a record of the
trial shall be maintained." (Ut. Code Annot. f 78-610(1), (2)
The unique nature of the effect of a trial de novo on the
general bar to rebringing an action under the doctrine of res
judicata has rarely been addressed in a Utah Appeals Court since
the days of Moss v. Taylorr 273 P 515 (1928) wherein the general
principle under old law was articulated in this way:
"When an appeal is taken to the district court from a
judgment rendered in the [lower] court, such judgment
ceases to be in any sense a final judgment. Unless the
appeal is dismissed, a trial de novo must be had in the
district court."
After all is said and done, however, in the intervening period of
nearly sixty seven years, the principle seems not to have changed
appreciably.

In more recent days, for example, Moaa is cited in

Restatement 2d as support for the general principle that
"the better view is that a judgment otherwise final
remains so despite the taking of an appeal unless what
is caled an appeal actually consists of a trial de
novo."(Judgments, s.s. 13, p. 135)
Utah Courts, in what little cases have made comment on this
principle, have never waivered from it.

In his dissent from the

majority opinion in Salt Lake City v. Piapenburg, 571 P.2d 1299,
Justice Maughn flatly states that
"A trial de novo is not an appeal." (8 1315, emphasis
added)

In expanding on the issue of when res judicata attaches, the
clearly controlling case for this set of facts is a fairly recent
one, Kirk v, Div. Of Occ. & Pro. Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah
App. 1991) which first quotes a guiding principle for judges who
consider such matters, as found in 4 K. Davis, Administrative Law
Treatise s.s. 21:3 (2d ed. 1983) which states
"When an agency conducts a trial-type hearing, makes
findings, and applies the law, the reasons for treating
its decision as res judicata are the same as the
reasons for applying res judicata to a decision of a
court that has used the same procedure.
But the
formality may be diminished in any degree, and when it
is sufficiently diminished, the administrative decision
may not be res judicata. The starting point in drawing
the line is the observation that res judicata applies
when what the agency does resembles what a trial court
does."
Kirk, makes the key distinction, that in some cases, formality may
be diminished when prior proceedings do not resemble true court
proceedings in some important areas, and thus, when it is so
diminished, a decision thereunder may well not be res judicata.
That is clearly the case here.

Like a justice court, in a small

claims court no record of proceedings is made except for the
terse order filled out at the end of the proceeding.

This

informality is one of the critical things that makes an appeal by
trial de novo so necessary, so that the required formality of a
record is present to accompany the proceedings in general.

The

lack of this in Kirk was fatal to the lower decision and resulted
in reversal, for, as the Court said,
"There were no written findings of fact, no written
conclusions of law, and the hearing itself was not
recorded . . . [g]iven the informal nature in which
this hearing was conducted, we cannot conclude that it

afforded Kirk the rights and procedural safeguards that
must be present when an agency acts in a judicial
capacity conducting a trial type hearing.
For this
reason, res judicata could not attach to the proceeding
. . .".(0244)
Clearly, the foregoing quote is strongly determinative in the
present set of circumstances.
initial

Small

Claims

In the case here, not only was the

hearing

lacking

in

the

necessities

enunciated in Kirk that would have given rise to the use of res
judicata at the District Court level, but for reasons that can
only be guessed at, rather than a continuance being granted in
the trial de novo at the circuit level, instead it was not held
at all, and a prejudicial judgment (as if the case were decided
meritoriously,
Plaintiff.

which
This

it

being

clearly
the

was

case,

not)

Plaintiff

entered
lacks

against
still

a

meritorious determination of the issues, and therefore it was
error for the District Court to apply res judicata in this
particular case in the clear absence of any meritorious verdict;
for again, and this cannot be stressed too much, it is obvious to
any careful reader of the proceedings at the next level that,
under the circumstances, no meritorious finding could possibly
have been made about Plaintiff's claims, hence Plaintifffs right
to such has been unquestionably been abrograted.
CONCLUSION
The cases cited are on point, determinative, and entirely
controlling in the matter presently before the Court.

Plaintiff

was not only denied a meritorious determination in a court of
record on her claims, but when she attempted to bring this matter

to the attention of the court of general jurisdiction in this
state, the doctrine of res judicata was misapplied by a judge of
that Court.

To do anything but send this case back to a lower

level for that trial de novo would work a clear injustice to the
Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Court has no choice but to reverse

and remand so that this claim can be adjudicated, one way or the
other, meritoriously.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ Z . day of February, 1995.

CERTIFICATION QF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that I served a copy
of the foregoing

on Defendant at the following address, and in

the manner below indicated:
Brett G. Pearce, Attorney at Law
Richard K. Spratley & Associates
4021 South 700 East, Suite 250
Salt Lake City UT 84107

U.S. Mail
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Telecopier

t^

DATED this 31

day of February 1995.
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PQUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT
ast 868CrSduth, Sandy, Utah 84070
>*»%:. --

Name

, Plaintiff )

______

Agent & Title -^fr^WI^
-«-*•

SMALL CtAIMS
JUDGMENT

)

iB?^^-.---5' »V

'-"Sfo? 2 * _

gSfcfc-ar:-- ••"^: -

Street Address
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City, State, Zij
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Agent & Title — * ^
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Street AHHroaa

•
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--» "•.

"•

-

* * * -

"

Phone.

City, State, Zip
Date of Trial _

"&l(tl&"

Parties Appearing: ^ ^ a i n t i f f >Q^befendant
The Court Orders Judgment as follows:
• For Plaintiff
$ _

.Principal

$

.Court Costs

. Total Judgment, with interest at 12% per year until paid.
This judgment is effective for 8 years.
$

u For Defendant
XF?
i g No cause of Action
^3\Dismissalwi- 1 Prejudice (plaintiff may not refile case)
D Dismissal without Prejudice (plaintiff may refile case)

Dated.

I

• mailed

Dated

^fifi.nSf

Judge

NQ^el
NTT/delivered
a copy of this judgment to

tfjfy?

, 19^2=

iintiff

^Q^efendant

ItffcJ—

.Qi cm a+11 ro rff P l n i n

i

i

B r e t t G. P e a r c e
[5220]
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES

Attorney for Defendants
4021 South 700 East, Suite 250
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-7007
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SANDY DEPARTMENT
..OOOOO..
LYNN NIELSEN

:
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

CIVIL NO.
RONALD MORTENSEN and DEL RAE
MORTENSEN

920003815

:
Judge Roger A. Livingston

Defendants.

Came on for trial in the above-captioned matter on Friday, August
28, 1992 at 2:00 p.m.

Defendants were represented by Brett G. Pearce

of Richard K. Spratley & Associates. Plaintiff made no appearance
either personally or through an attorney. A friend of plaintiff's
appeared and requested a continuance. The Court was of the opinion
that because plaintiff did not attend the scheduled trial either
personally or through counsel, she failed to appear; therefore, no
proper motion for continuance was before the Court. Also, even.after
considering the matters upon which the motion for continuance was
based, the Court was of the opinion that plaintiff failed to show the
requisite due diligence. After having fully considered the matter and
\

being fully advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: that plaintiff's

A-2

claims against defendants in the above-referenced case are hereby
dismissed with prejudice.

If plaintiff files any motion, petition or

takes any action to set this judgment and order aside, plaintiff must,
as a condition precedent, pay all reasonable attorneys fees and costs
incurred by defendants in defending against the claims brought in the
instant case.
DATED this ^\J\

day of October;

l&p.

~ BY THE.. COURT:
•t

5^-

'< s-j

'^ ~ \>- ?yy<&"

i'Rptjer A. Livingsto.n^^^^^^^^ ^
tfhird Circuit fcowft 'Judge

CERTIFICATE QF MAILINg
I hereby certify that I have mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Judgment and Order, postage prepaid, to Defendant Lynn
Nielsen, P.O. Box 1944, Sandy, Utah 84091, this
1992.

7

day of October,

FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE
Salt Lake County Utah
Brett G. Pearce [5220]
JM
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendants
4021 South 700 East, Suite 420
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Telephone: (801) 266-7007
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

0 3 1994

..ooOoo..
LYNN NIELSEN,

:
ORDER
Plaintiff,

v.

:
:
CIVIL NO.

RONALD MORTENSEN and DELRAE
MORTENSEN,

930904041PI

:
Judge John A. Rokich

Defendants.
Came on for hearing in the above-captioned matter, defendants'
motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, on May 9, 1994 at 9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff was represented by her attorney, Lynn C. Spafford.
Defendants were represented by their attorney of record, Brett G.
Pearce.

Of particular concern to the Court at the instant hearing was

whether plaintiff knew she had been injured in the April 10, 1991 slip
and fall when she filed her April 13, 1992 Small Claims Action against
defendants.
After hearing sworn testimony of plaintiff and reviewing
evidence proffered by defense counsel, the Court was persuaded that
plaintiff knew of her alleged personal injuries long before the April
13, 1992 Small Claims Action against defendants was filed.
Additionally, after reviewing the memoranda and arguments submitted by
both plaintiff's and defendants' counsel, the Court was of the opinion

that applicable law prohibited plaintiff from splitting her cause of
action and that plaintiff's complaint in the instant case is barred by
operation of the doctrine of res judicata.
Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's complaint against
defendants in the instant case is'dismissed with prejudice, each party
to bear their own costs.
DATED this

<j? day of r\ (JC+-~<^

, 1994.

d District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE QF MAILING
I do hereby certify that on this

\^[

day oi\T\(h\

, 1994, I

mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to, Earl S.
Spafford, and Lynn C. Spafford, Attorneys for Plaintiff, SPAFFORD &
SPAFFORD, 230 South 500 East, Suite 150, Salt Lake City, Utah

84102.

